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On close inspection many of the most popular explanations for the subprime crisis turn out to be myths. Empirical 
research shows that the causes of the subprime mortgage crisis and its magnitude were more complicated than 
mortgage interest rate resets, declining underwriting standards, or declining home values. Nor were its causes unlike 
other crises of the past. The subprime crisis was building for years before showing any signs and was fed by lending, 
securitization, leveraging, and housing booms.
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Subprime mortgages have been getting a lot of attention in 
the United States since 2000, when the number of subprime 
loans being originated and reﬁ  nanced shot up rapidly. The 
attention intensiﬁ  ed in 2007, when defaults on subprime 
loans began to skyrocket. Researchers, policymakers, and 
the public have tried to identify the factors that explained 
these defaults. 
Unfortunately, many of the most popular explanations that 
have emerged for the subprime crisis are, to a large extent, 
myths. On close inspection, these explanations are not sup-
ported by empirical research.
Myth 1: Subprime mortgages went only to borrowers 
with impaired credit
Subprime mortgages went to all kinds of borrowers, not 
only to those with impaired credit. A loan can be labeled 
subprime not only because of the characteristics of the bor-
rower it was originated for, but also because of the type of 
lender that originated it, features of the mortgage product 
itself, or how it was securitized. 
Speciﬁ  cally, if a loan was given to a borrower with a low 
credit score or a history of delinquency or bankruptcy, 
lenders would most likely label it subprime. But mortgages 
could also be labeled subprime if they were originated by a 
lender specializing in high-cost loans—although not all high-
cost loans are subprime. Also, unusual types of mortgages 
generally not available in the prime market, such as “2/28 
hybrids,” which switch to an adjustable interest rate after 
only two years of a ﬁ  xed rate, would be labeled subprime 
even if they were given to borrowers with credit scores that 
were sufﬁ  ciently high to qualify for prime mortgage loans. 
The process of securitizing a loan could also affect its sub-
prime designation. Many subprime mortgages were secu-
ritized and sold on the secondary market. Securitizers rank 
ordered pools of mortgages from the most to the least risky 
at the time of securitization, basing the ranking on a combi-
nation of several risk factors, such as credit score, loan-to-
value and debt-to-income ratios, etc. The most risky pools 
would become a part of a subprime security. All the loans in 
that security would be labeled subprime, regardless of the 
borrowers’ credit scores. 
The myth that subprime loans went only to those with bad 
credit arises from overlooking the complexity of the sub-
prime mortgage market and the fact that subprime mort-
gages are deﬁ  ned in a number of ways—not just by the credit 
quality of borrowers. One of the myth’s byproducts is that 
examples of borrowers with good credit and subprime loans 
have been seen as evidence of foul play, generating accusa-
tions that such borrowers must have been steered unfairly 
and sometimes fraudulently into the subprime market. 
Myth 2: Subprime mortgages promoted homeownership
The availability of subprime mortgages in the United States 
did not facilitate increased homeownership. Between 2000 
and 2006, approximately one million borrowers took sub-
prime mortgages to ﬁ  nance the purchase of their ﬁ  rst home. 
These subprime loans did contribute to an increased level 
of homeownership in the country—at the time of mortgage 
origination. Unfortunately, many homebuyers with sub-
prime loans defaulted within a couple of years of origina-
tion. The number of such defaults outweighs the number of 
ﬁ  rst-time homebuyers with subprime mortgages. 
Given that there were more defaults among all (not just 
ﬁ  rst-time) homebuyers with subprime loans than there were 
ﬁ  rst-time homebuyers with subprime loans, it is impossible to 
conclude that subprime mortgages promoted homeownership. 
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mortgages within one year of origination were 17 percent 
for mortgages originated in 2006 and 20 percent for those 
originated in 2007. In contrast, the rates of default within 
one year of origination for mortgages originated to buy a 
home were 23 percent and 27 percent for the origination 
years 2006 and 2007, respectively. 
Myth 6: Subprime mortgages failed because of 
mortgage rate resets
Among subprime loans, the most popular type of adjust-
able rate mortgage (ARM) is a hybrid, a loan whose interest 
rate is reset after an initial two- or three-year period of ﬁ  xed 
rates. A ﬁ  xed-rate mortgage (FRM), on the other hand, 
never has its rate reset. The belief that rate resets caused 
many subprime defaults has its origin in the statistical analy-
ses of loan performance that were done on these two types 
of loans soon after the problems with subprime mortgages 
were coming to light. Those analyses compared loan perfor-
mance in a way that was conventional at the time, but which 
turned out to be inappropriate for these loans. 
To ascertain whether ARMs or FRMs were experiencing 
different levels of default, analysts compared the proportion 
of outstanding FRMs that were delinquent to the proportion 
of outstanding ARMs that were delinquent. Based on that 
comparison, the proportion of delinquent hybrid loans had 
begun to skyrocket after 2006, while that of ﬁ  xed-rate loans 
looked as if it was fairly stable. 
The problem with this type of analysis is that it hid prob-
lems with FRMs because it considered all outstanding 
loans; that is, it combined loans that had been originated in 
different years. Combining old with more recent loans inﬂ  u-
ences the results, ﬁ  rst, because older loans tend to perform 
better. Second, FRM loans were losing their popularity from 
2001 to 2007, so fewer loans of this type were being origi-
nated every year. When newer loans were defaulting more 
than the older loans, any newer FRM defaults were hidden 
inside the large stock of older FRMs. By contrast, the ARM 
defaults were more visible inside the younger ARM stock.
To illustrate the problem, consider the following example. 
Suppose there are 1,000 FRMs and 100 ARMs outstanding 
in the market. In the current year, 100 new FRMs and 100 
new ARMs are originated. Suppose the default rate for both 
types of new loans is 100 percent within a year and that old 
loans do not default. The observed default rate for FRMs 
is 100 out of 1,100 outstanding loans (9.1 percent), and the 
default rate for ARMs is 100 out of 200 outstanding loans 
(50 percent). Even though the level of default is the same for 
all new originations, the FRM pool looks much healthier.
If we compare the performance of adjustable- and ﬁ  xed-
rate loans by year of origination (which keeps new and old 
loans separate), we ﬁ  nd that FRMs originated in 2006 and 
2007 had 2.6 and 3.5 times more delinquent loans within 
one year of origination, respectively, than those originated 
in 2003. Likewise, ARMs originated in 2006 and 2007 had 
Myth 3: Declines in home values caused the subprime 
crisis in the United States 
Researchers, policymakers, and the general public have no-
ticed that a large number of mortgage defaults and foreclo-
sures followed the decline in house prices. This observation 
resulted in a general belief that the crisis occurred because 
of declining home values. 
The decline in home values only revealed the problems with 
subprime mortgages; it did not cause the defaults. Research 
shows that the quality of newly originated mortgages was 
worsening every year between 2001 and 2007; the crisis was 
brewing for many years before house prices even started 
slowing down. But because the housing boom allowed 
homeowners to reﬁ  nance even the worst mortgages, we did 
not see this negative trend in loan quality for years preced-
ing the crisis.
Myth 4: Declines in mortgage underwriting standards 
triggered the subprime crisis 
An analysis of subprime mortgages shows that within the 
ﬁ  rst year of origination, approximately 10 percent of the 
mortgages originated between 2001 and 2005 were delin-
quent or in default, and approximately 20 percent of the 
mortgages originated in 2006 and 2007 were delinquent or 
in default. This rapid jump in default rates was among the 
ﬁ  rst signs of the beginning crisis. 
If deteriorating underwriting standards explain this phenom-
enon, we would be able to observe a substantial loosening of 
the underwriting criteria between 2001-2005 and 2006-2007, 
periods between which the default rates doubled. The data, 
however, show no such change in standards. 
Actually, the criteria that are associated with larger default 
rates, such as debt-to-income or loan-to-value ratios, were, 
on average, worsening a bit every year from 2001 to 2007, 
but the changes between the 2001-2005 and 2006-2007 peri-
ods were not sufﬁ  ciently high to explain the near 100 percent 
increase in default rates for loans originated in these years. 
Myth 5: Subprime mortgages failed because 
people used homes as ATMs
Rising house prices and falling mortgage interest rates 
before 2006 gave many homeowners an opportunity to reﬁ  -
nance their mortgages and extract cash. The cash extracted 
from home equity could be spent for home improvements, 
bill payments, or general goods and services. Among sub-
prime mortgages that were securitized, more than half were 
originated to reﬁ  nance existing mortgages into larger ones 
and to take cash out of home equity. 
While this option was popular throughout the subprime 
years (2001-2007), it was not a primary factor in causing 
the massive defaults and foreclosures that occurred after 
both home prices and interest rates reversed their paths. 
Mortgages that were originated for reﬁ  nancing actually 
performed better than mortgages originated solely to buy 
a home (comparing mortgages of the same age and origi-
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after origination, respectively, than those originated in 2003. 
In short, FRMs showed as many signs of distress as did 
ARMs. These signs for both types of mortgage were there 
at the same time; it is not correct to conclude that FRMs 
started facing larger foreclosure rates after the crisis was 
initiated by the ARMs.
Myth 7: Subprime borrowers with hybrid mortgages 
were offered (low) “teaser rates” 
By design, a hybrid mortgage contract offers a ﬁ  xed mort-
gage rate for a couple of years; after that, the rate is sched-
uled to reset once or twice a year to the current market rate 
plus a margin that is prespeciﬁ  ed in the contract. A market 
rate combined with the margin may be lower or higher than 
the initial ﬁ  xed mortgage rate, as it largely depends on the 
market rate that prevails at the reset time.
Hybrid mortgages were available both in prime and sub-
prime mortgage markets, but at signiﬁ  cantly different terms. 
Those in the prime market offered signiﬁ  cantly lower 
introductory ﬁ  xed rates, known as “teaser rates,” compared 
to rates following the resets. People assumed that the initial 
rates for subprime loans were also just as low and they 
applied the same label to them—“teaser rates.” We need to 
understand, though, that the initial rates offered to subprime 
hybrid borrowers may have been lower than they most like-
ly would have been for the same borrowers had they taken 
a ﬁ  xed-rate subprime mortgage, but they were deﬁ  nitely not 
low in absolute terms.
The average subprime hybrid mortgage rates at origina-
tion were in the 7.3–9.7 percent range for the years 2001-
2007, compared to average prime hybrid mortgage rates at 
origination of around 2-3 percent. The subprime ﬁ  gures are 
hardly “teaser rates.”
Myth 8: The subprime mortgage crisis in the 
United States was totally unexpected 
Observing the extent of the subprime mortgage crisis in 
the United States and the global ﬁ  nancial crisis that fol-
lowed, it is hard to tell that this turmoil and its magnitude 
were anticipated by anyone. The data suggest, though, that 
some market participants were likely aware of an impending 
market correction. 
In a market with rapidly rising prices, mortgage contracts 
that cannot be sustained can be terminated through prepay-
ment or reﬁ  nancing. Borrowers can change houses and 
mortgage contracts easily in a booming environment, and 
defaults do not occur as frequently as they would without 
the boom. Because of this ability to dispose of unsustainable 
mortgages, signs of the crisis brewing between 2001 and 
2005 were hidden behind a “mask” of rising house prices. 
Using a statistical model to control for rising housing prices, 
Otto Van Hemert and I determined that default rates were 
increasing every year for six consecutive years before the 
crisis had shown any signs. This deterioration is observable 
now, with the help of hindsight and research ﬁ  ndings, but it 
was also known to some extent to those who were securitizing 
subprime mortgages in those years. Securitizers seemed to have 
been adjusting mortgage interest rates to reﬂ  ect this deteriora-
tion in loan quality. In short, lenders’ expectations of the increas-
ing risk of massive defaults among subprime borrowers were 
forming for years before the crisis; most likely, it was not the 
crisis that was unexpected, it was its timing and magnitude. 
Myth 9: The subprime mortgage crisis in the 
United States  is unique in its origins 
The mortgage crisis in the United States is large and devastat-
ing, and it has led to global ﬁ  nancial turmoil. In this sense, it 
is certainly unique. However, neither the origin of this crisis 
or the way it has played out was unique at all. In fact, it seems 
to have followed the classic lending boom-and-bust scenario 
that has been observed historically in many countries. In this 
scenario, a lending boom of a sizable magnitude leads to a 
lending-market collapse if it is associated with a deterioration 
in lending standards, an increase in the riskiness of loans, and 
a decrease in the price markup of said risk. Argentina in 1980, 
Chile in 1982, Sweden, Norway, and Finland in 1992, Mexico 
in 1994, and Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea in 1997 all expe-
rienced a pattern similar to the U.S. subprime boom-and-bust 
cycle. The United Stated has had similar episodes, though on 
a smaller scale, as well: a crisis with farm loans in the 1980s 
and one with commercial real estate loans in the 1990s. 
Myth 10: The subprime mortgage market was 
too small to cause big problems
Before the crisis, there was a conventional belief that a mar-
ket as relatively small as the U.S. subprime mortgage market 
(about 16 percent of all U.S. mortgage debt in 2008) could 
not cause signiﬁ  cant problems in wider arenas even if it were 
to crash completely. However, we now see a severe ongoing 
crisis—a crisis that has affected the real economies of many 
countries in the world, causing recessions, banking and ﬁ  nan-
cial turmoil, and a credit crunch—radiating out from failures in 
the subprime market. Why is it so? 
The answer lies in the complexity of the market for the securi-
ties that were derived from subprime mortgages. Not only 
were the securities traded directly, they were also repackaged 
to create more complicated ﬁ  nancial instruments (derivatives), 
such as collateralized debt obligations. The derivatives were 
again split into various tranches, repackaged, re-split and 
repackaged again many times over. This, most likely, was one 
of the mechanisms that ampliﬁ  ed problems in the subprime se-
curitized market, and the subsequent subprime-related losses. 
Each stage of the securitization process increased the leverage 
ﬁ  nancial institutions were taking on (as they were purchas-
ing the securities and derivatives with borrowed money) and 
made it more difﬁ  cult to value their holdings of those ﬁ  nancial 
instruments. With the growing leverage and inability to value 
the securities, uncertainty about the solvency of a number of 
large ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms grew. 
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Many of the myths presented here single out some character-
istic of subprime loans, subprime borrowers, or the economic 
circumstances in which those loans were made as the cause 
of the crisis. All these factors are certainly important for 
borrowers with subprime mortgages in terms of their ability 
to keep their homes and make regular mortgage payments. 
A borrower with better credit characteristics, a steady job, a 
loan with a low interest rate, and a home whose value keeps 
increasing is much less likely to default on a mortgage than a 
borrower with everything in reverse. 
But the causes of the subprime mortgage crisis and its mag-
nitude were more complicated than mortgage interest rate 
resets, declining underwriting standards, or declining home 
values. The crisis had been building for years before show-
ing any signs. It was feeding off the lending, securitization, 
leveraging, and housing booms. 
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